The argument in which this part of the question is dealt with is of great interest, but is too much involved in details of evidence to be quoted with advantage to the reader. Suffice it to say, that the alleged delusions and eccentricities of Colonel Maclean are very thoroughly sifted, and that the judge arrives at the very clear conclusion that none of these were proved to be such as to invalidate the spontaneous and intelligent character of the deed, as shown forth in the draft deed itself, and in the correspondence. The question of fraud and circumvention is then disposed of in the same way, and under the same thoroughly practical aspect of its bearings. The general conclusion is that the will is plainly a personal and spontaneous act,?the act of a man who knew what he was doing, and understood its consequences ; and who, moreover, was under no proved delusion of mind as to the motives, nor under any undue influence as to the object of the settlement. And if these questions of fact are so settled by the jury, the judge holds that the deed must be pronounced valid, simply because it is, in effect, the real and spontaneous will of the testator, and is not the result either of mental incapacity, or of facility acted upon by fraud. The follow^ ing brief extract sets in a clear point of view the judge's opinion of the complicated general evidence led on behalf of the pursuer. As formerly, I omit most of the references to details, and give only so much as seems to bear upon the principle of the opinion.
" Now, gentlemen, that 
